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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a memorable scene in the Canadian documentary, "The
Corporation," where Sir Mark Moody-Stuart recounts an exchange
between himself, at the time Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell, his wife,
and a crew of Earth First activists who arrived on the doorstep of their
country home.1 The protesters chanted and hurled a banner over the
Moody-Stuart's roof that read "MURDERERS" referring to accusations
against Royal Dutch Shell for complicity in crimes against humanity in
Nigeria.2 Acts of murder, torture, and arbitrary arrests and detention of
any local who spoke out, were allegedly committed by Nigerian troops
called in by Royal Dutch Shell, in association with its oil pipeline
project.3 Interestingly, the response of the surprised Moody-Stuarts was
not to call the police, but to engage in a civil dialogue with their
uninvited guests, to share concerns about human rights and the
environment, and to serve tea to the protesters on their front lawn. 4 The
I J.D candidate, 2006, Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to thank Alison
Miller, Catherine Vuong, Martha Boden and Dana Gould for their assistance with this article.
1. THE CORPORATION (Zeitgeist Films 2004).
2. Karen Ballentine and Mark Taylor, Business and International Crimes: Assessing the
Liability of Business Entities for Gross Violations of International Law 13 (Dec. 1, 2004), available
at http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/exe-summary.pdf (last visited June 3, 2005). This report assesses
legal liability for gross violations of human rights that are founded on International law principles as
well as domestic law of Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, and France. The
report was funded by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian
International Development Agency, Department for International Development of the United
Kingdom, International Development Research Centre of Canada, Government of Norway,
Government of Switzerland, Government of Sweden, Rockefeller Foundation United Nations
Foundation, Government of Norway, and Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade.
3. Id.
4. THE CORPORATION, supra note 1.
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scene highlights the complexity of placing responsibility for corporate
misdeeds; there is rarely a villain or an individual who can be held
accountable for the harms that corporations cause.
While corporations are comprised of individuals and are regarded
as "persons" by law, they are not persons like you or me.5 There is no
single brain behind a corporation. Rather, each individual actor from the
employees to the executives and directors is driven by the duty to
maximize shareholder value and makes day-to-day decisions for the
entity's survival and prosperity. 6 The Earth First activists on Sir Moody's
lawn were without a villain in their protest, and their chants and banner
would be misplaced on anyone's front lawn. Changing corporate
behavior requires a fundamental recasting of how corporate law works.
Corporations are important social actors. They are created by law
and create products, services, jobs, and wealth upon which modem
societies rely. Investments injected by corporations bring jobs, capital,
and technology to communities, thereby raising living standards and
creating derivative rights such as education, health and housing, and
political freedoms.7 Modem corporations allow entrepreneurs to raise
massive amounts of capital for large projects and research, which results
in innovation and a wide range of products and services.8 However, these
same corporations can also cause social harm. They are structured in
such a way that it is possible for agents in the corporation to engage in
morally objectionable conduct, for those agents to disown such conduct,9
and for the conduct to go unpunished.
Some scholars have classified this as a crisis in corporate social
responsibility.' 0 Current debates have spurred resurgence 1 not only in
the idea of corporate social responsibility, but also in innovative and
practical ways to make corporate social responsibility a legal reality.12
5. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (likening a
corporation to a natural person for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. See generally D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998).
7. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 933 (2004).
8. Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 830-31 (2004).
9. Id. at 834.
10. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Finding Strategic Corporate Citizenship: A New Game Theoretic
View, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 1957 (2004) (citing Scandal Scorecard, Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at
B I).
11. Attention to corporate social responsibility is not new; a considerable movement emerged
in the 1970s aimed primarily at regulatory constraints. Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive
Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2002).
12. See e.g., The Center for Corporate Policy Model Legislation, available at http://
www.corporatepolicy.org/topics/statelaws.htm (last visited June 11, 2005) (providing a list of
various corporation related bills in consideration around the United States).
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One example of an innovative and practical way to change
corporate behavior is the Code for Corporate Citizenship ("the Code").
The legislatures of California, Minnesota, and Maine have tabled
adoption of the Code for consideration. 13 The Code addresses
unpunished corporate misdeeds at the source - the corporate fiduciary
duty. This article suggests that the Code should be adopted in every state
because the current configuration of the corporate fiduciary duty
inadequately governs corporate decision-making at an unacceptable cost
to society. Part II is a brief case study of how government regulation, as
the sole external method of managing corporate decision-making, falls
well short of preventing harm in the meat and poultry packing industry.
This example serves to paint a picture of how unaccountable and
irresponsible pursuit of profit at all costs can result in real harm. Part III
discusses the shareholder primacy underpinnings of current corporate
chartering law. While most corporations do not cause harm, laws of
incorporation are almost universally written in such a way that
shareholders' interests are paramount and external costs are irrelevant.
Thus there is the potential for social harm. Part IV outlines the Code of
Corporate Citizenship and how certain abuses can be prevented by
amending laws of incorporation and by broadening the duties of
corporate directors. This section also addresses some of the initial
criticisms of the Code. Part V concludes that the Code, though in need
one slight amendment, should be adopted nationwide because
broadening the duty of corporate decision-makers is the most effective
way of enforcing socially responsible corporate behavior.
II. CASE STUDY: THE EXTERNAL COSTS
OF THE MEAT-PACKING BUSINESS
Working in the meat and poultry packing industry is dangerous.' 4 In
the United States, many workers face real peril of losing a limb or even
their lives in unsafe working conditions.' 5 The increasing volume and
speed of production coupled with close quarters, poor training, and
insufficient safeguards create hazardous working in the meat and poultry
industry.' 6 On each shift, workers make up to 30,000 hard-cutting
motions with sharp knives causing massive repetitive motion injuries."
13. S.B. 917, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); S.F. 1529, 83rd Sess. (Minn. 2005); S. Paper
222, 122nd Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Me. 2005).
14. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR: WORKERS RIGHTS IN
U.S. MEAT AND POULTRY PLANTS, (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/usaOI05/
usa0105.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005) [hereinafter BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR].
15. Id. at 30.
16. Id. at 33.
17. Id. at36.
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Workers who are injured on the job often do not receive compensation
because companies fail to report injuries, delay and deny claims, and
take reprisals against workers who file compensation claims.'
8
The meat and poultry packing industry has the highest rate of injury
and illness in the manufacturing sector.1 9 A special investigative report in
2003 by the Omaha World-Herald has documented death and serious
injuries in Nebraska meatpacking industry plants since 1999.20 The
report concluded that nearly one hundred night shift cleaning workers in
the state meatpacking industry suffered amputations and crushings of
body parts between 1999 and 2003.21 One Nebraska expert explained
that: "despite the hardhats, goggles, earplugs, stainless-steel mesh gloves,
plastic forearm guards, chain-mail aprons and chaps, leather
weightlifting belts, even baseball catcher's shin guards and hockey
masks . . . the reported injury and illness rate for meatpacking was ... 20
per hundred full-time workers in 2001. This is two-and-a-half times
greater than the average manufacturing rate of 8.1 and almost four times
more than the overall rate for private industry of 7.4."22
These severe injuries are just the tip of the iceberg. Distinct from
the endemic problems of repetitive stress or musculoskeletal injuries are
thousands of lacerations, contusions, bums, fractures, punctures, and
23other forms of traumatic injuries. Workers on the job often face
dismissal for filing workers' compensation claims or organizing in an
attempt to improve conditions.24 With an increasing percentage of these
jobs being held by immigrant workers, some of them undocumented, the
risk of reporting hazards is even greater.
25
On October 9, 2003, thirty-one-year-old Jason Kelly died while
repairing a leak in the "hydrolizer" equipment used to process chicken
feathers at Tyson Foods' River Valley animal feed plant in Texarkana,
Texas.26 Hydrogen sulfide, a poisonous gas created by decaying organic
matter, was leaking from the hydrolizer while Jason Kelly was working
18. See id. at 57.
19. Id. at 30 (citing Jeremy Olson & Steve Jordon, Special Report: The Job of Last Resort,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 12, 2003, at IA; Laurie Kelliher, A Meat Story, Well Done: How the
Omaha World-Herald Inspected a Tough Local Industry, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, Jan.
2004, at 14).
20. Id. at 31.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 30 (quoting Donald D. Stull, Testimony against Nebraska Legislative Bills 586 and
725, Feb. 24, 2003) (Supported by employers, these bills would reduce workers' coverage and
benefits under Nebraska's workers' compensation statute).
23. See id. at 11.
24. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 1.
26. Id. at 29.
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on it.27 According to a coroner's report his cause of death was "acute
hydrogen sulfide intoxication." 28 Tyson Foods did not provide Jason
Kelly respiratory gear to guard against poisonous inhalation, failed to
label hazardous chemicals, and failed to train workers on how to detect
chemicals in case of a leak. 29 Tyson Foods is now is contesting an
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") citation and
fine in connection with Kelly's death, arguing that the cause of death was
not conclusively determined.3 ° If Tyson's effort to contest the cause of
death is successful, they will be relieved of paying the OSHA fine and
there will be no financial incentive for the company to prevent a similar
accident from occurring in the future.
The example of the meat packing industry may be extreme, but it
clearly shows that something is not working in the way corporate
decisions are regulated. Responsibility for workplace injuries and deaths
lies not just with employers, but also with the current state of workplace
health and safety laws. In the first place, regulations may be minimal.
For instance, federal regulations of "line speed 3 1 in meat packing plants
take into account only two factors: (1) avoiding adulterated meat and
poultry products, and (2) not hindering companies' productivity and
profits.32 Notably, the safety of workers is not a factor that must be
considered when a company makes line-speed decisions.
Additionally, regulating agencies are often poorly funded. While an
agency like OSHA is responsible for enforcing compliance with
standards, its budget falls below what is needed to carry out its
responsibilities effectively.33 Given OSHA's limited resources and the
huge number of workplace sites it covers, OSHA inspects less than one
percent of United States' workplaces annually. 34 Moreover, OSHA is




30. Id. (quoting Christopher Leonard, 436.000 Citation Disputed by Tyson, ARKANSAS
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Apr. 27, 2004, at 1).
31. See id. at 24. Meat and poultry workers consistently cite the speed of the lines as the main
source of danger. Id. at 33. Meatpackers try to maximize the volume of animals that go through the
plant by increasing the speed at which animals are processed because processing speed is directly
related to profits. Id. Workers labor amid high-speed automated machinery moving chickens and
carcasses at speeds that are hard to imagine: four hundred head of beef per hour, one thousand hogs
per hour, and thousands of broilers per hour. Id.
32. Id. at 33.
33. Id. at 28.
34. Id.
35. Specifically, once every 115 years. See CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION AND THE DISMANTLING OF PUBLIC SAFEGUARDS (May 2004), available at
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Although OSHA is empowered to refer cases of willful employer
violations causing worker fatalities to the Justice Department for
criminal prosecutions,36 it rarely exercises this power, even in situations
of repeat the violations.37 Furthermore, a willful violation is only a
misdemeanor that carries a maximum six-month jail term. 38 In the past
twenty years, OSHA has made criminal referrals to the Justice
Department in just seven percent of more than one thousand workplace
death cases due to willful employer violations.39
Using OSHA and Tyson Foods as examples, it is evident that
government regulation is ineffective at preventing harm that business
decisions can cause. That Tyson Foods could potentially avoid liability
for Jason Kelly's death and has no obligation to prevent the death of the
next employee who cleans the hydrolizer, suggests that corporations are
very unlike other "persons" in the law and can literally "get away with
murder." Something has to change, and Code for Corporate Citizenship
is an innovative and realistic step in the right direction.
III. CORPORATIONS TODAY: TO WHOM DO DIRECTORS OWE A DUTY?
Part of understanding how Tyson Foods may escape responsibility
for Jason Kelly's death is based on the current corporate structure -
specifically, to whom corporations owe a duty. The most common
framework for understanding the duty of corporations to the shareholder
is known as the shareholder primacy norm.40 It is this norm, based on the
maximization of profit at all costs, that ultimately allows corporations to
externalize social costs with close to impunity and has lead to a call for a
framework shift that comes from many different groups, including the
corporate community itself.
41
A. Corporate Charter Laws and the Shareholder Primacy Norm
The structure of corporate law ensures that corporations generally
operate in the financial interests of shareholders to the exclusion of other
http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521 -5D6FF2E06E03%7D/
SISPECIALINTERESTS.PDF (last visited on June 3, 2005).
36. BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR, supra note 14, at 28.
37. BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR, supra note 14, at 28.
38. BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR, supra note 14, at 28.
39. BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR, supra note 14, at 28.
40. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998) (arguing
that shareholder primacy is irrelevant to everyday business decisions); see also Testy, supra note 11,
at 1232. Shareholder primacy retains its hegemony in much legal and business commentary on
corporate governance.
41. See e.g., Thomas Donaldson, Defining the Value of Doing Good Business, FINANCIAL
TIMES, June 3, 2005, at 2.
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considerations. 42 This shareholder-centric view of corporate law is often
referred to as shareholder primacy.43 The basic premise is that the
manager's greatest duty is to shareholders and maximizing their wealth.44
Moreover, shareholders exercise control over corporations by electing
directors, approving fundamental transactions, and bringing derivative
suits on behalf of the corporation. 45 The shareholder primacy norm
manifests itself as the corporation's pursuit of profit.46  Since
shareholders are also investors, their main objective is that the
corporation's profits be maximized in order to acquire the greatest return
on their investment.47
Philosophically, the shareholder primacy norm is derived from neo-
classical economics 48 and suggests that the best way for corporations to
serve the social good is to benefit shareholders. 49 Put in basic terms, the
argument is that focusing on increasing wealth increases social welfare
by assisting in fulfilling the role of business in society. 50 Indeed, the only
social good that corporations achieve is producing profit, and that is their
only social responsibility.51 Society benefits when corporations increase
shareholders' profits; an increase in corporate profit results in an increase
of corporate taxes paid, increases in tax revenue results in more secure
employees, and more secure employees creates a more stable
community.52 Under the shareholder primacy norm view, corporate law
also exists to serve shareholder interests.53 This notion was first captured
in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
42. Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 89, 89 (2005)
(arguing for the adoption of new principles to govern corporations for the protection of the public
good).
43. Smith, supra note 40, at 278.
44. Testy, supra note 11, at 1231.
45. Smith, supra note 40, at 278.
46. Smith, supra note 40, at 278.
47. Smith, supra note 40, at 278.
48. Professor Benedict Sheehy, The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic and
Jurisprudential Values and the Future of Corporate Law, 2 DEPAUL BuS. & COM. L.J. 463, 478
(2004).
49. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Developments in the Law-Corporations and Society, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2169, 2177 (2004).
50. Sheehy, supra note 48, at 48 1.
51. Sheehy, supra note 48, at 480-81 (quoting Milton Friedman's famous statement "the one
and only social responsibility of business - to use resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits.").
52. Sheehy, supra note 48, at 481.
53. Sheehy, supra note 48, at 480.
20051
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the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change
in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
54
Thus, Dodge tells us that the corporate fiduciary duty is simply that
a corporate director must make decisions in the best interests of the
shareholders.55 Other stakeholders' interests do not enter the duty
equation and, therefore, the corporation owes no inherent duty to these
other stakeholders.5 6 The duty is configured this way in every jurisdiction
where corporations operate; interestingly, the corporate purpose
embodied in each state's corporate chartering laws is almost identical.
57
The corporate fiduciary duty is made up of two specific duties: (1) a
duty of care and, (2) a duty of loyalty.5 s Generally, the duty of care to the
shareholders is to act as a normally prudent person in the same position
in exercising decision-making and oversight functions.59 Directors can be
held personally liable if they cannot prove that they exercised requisite
care.60 The liability standard in such cases is gross negligence.6'
Generally, the duty of loyalty owed to shareholders is that directors act,
individually and as a group, in good faith and in the best interests of the
corporation.62
Thus, in California, for example, the duty of corporate directors is
to act "in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders ... ,63 In Minnesota and
Washington State, a director must discharge duties in good faith and in a
manner that the director "reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation. ',64 Delaware case law states that directors have an
unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and
stockholders alike. 65 Thus, even though corporate social responsibility
and maximizing profit often converge,66 the plain language of corporate
54. 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
55. See generally id.
56. Sheehy, supra note 48, at 501.
57. See infra notes 63-65.
58. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW §§ 4.1-4.2 (2000).
59. CG Hintmann, You Gotta Have Faith: Good Faith in the Context of Directorial Fiduciary
Duties and the Future Impact on Corporate Culture, 49 ST. LOuis U. L.J. 571, 579 (2005).
60. Id.
61. Id. This is the case at least in Delaware, where the majority of United States corporations
are incorporated today. Id. at 572, 576.
62. Id. at 578.
63. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (2005).
64. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE §
23B.08.420 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 Sess.).
65. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P., v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 979 (Del. 2003).
66. See Donaldson, supra note 41, at 2.
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chartering laws show that corporate directors are ultimately only duty
bound to the corporation.
B. The Current Corporate Fiduciary Duty:
Allowing the Externalization of the Social Costs of Doing Business
It is the limited duty of corporate directors that creates an
environment where a corporate decision may cause harm and allows the
harmful conduct to go unpunished. Since directors only owe a legal duty
to shareholders, directors may regard external interests as irrelevant in
their decision making.67 However, these external interests have a cost
and society is often left with the bill. As a result, corporations can benefit
from being part of society without being responsible for the costs.
68
Arguably, the corporate duty as it currently stands allows corporations to
operate with a "deferred-cost" approach where social, environmental,
and other costs are created with the hope that they will not be discovered
or enforced through the legal system until shareholders have made their
profits.
69
Additionally, limiting the corporate fiduciary duty to the financial
interests of shareholders may prevent decisions that serve the greater
society. For instance, if a board made a decision that benefited its
employees financially but imposed long-term costs on shareholders, even
if the benefits to the employees would far outweigh the costs, such a
decision would violate the board's duties under existing law. ° This
normative reality also explains why directors, as agents of a corporation,
may behave differently than they might as individual citizens. 71 Directors
can demand that their subordinates "make the numbers" and pay little
attention to how the subordinates do so. 72 The directors' continued
employment, salaries, bonuses, and stock options depend on continuing
profits.7 3 The subordinates also know that their livelihood depends upon
67. See generally Robert Hinkley, How Corporate Law Inhibits Social Responsibility,
BUSINESS-ETHICS: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, Jan/Feb 2002, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0119-04.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
68. Sheehy, supra note 48, at 503.
69. Sheehy, supra note 48, at 504. Additionally, because the United States' economy is so
reliant on consumer spending, the model depends on a robust economy and social security system to
catch the fall-out in an economic downturn. Sheehy, supra note 48, at 502. Moreover, the exclusion
of stakeholder interests has lead to considerable anti-corporate backlash, which also comes at
wasteful cost to the corporation. Sheehy, supra note 48, at 505.
70. Greenfield, supra note 42, at 100.
71. Greenfield, supra note 42, at 100 ("The human being who would not harm you on an
individual, face-to-face basis, who is charitable, civic-minded, loving and devout, will wound or kill
you from behind the corporate veil.").
72. Hinkley, supra note 67.
73. Hinkley, supra note 67.
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satisfying the profit motive.74 Therefore directors and subordinates have
little incentive to offer ideas that consider externalities or the public
interest, unless those ideas result in profit. 75 Robert Hinkley,76 author of
the Code, has stated:
Corporate law thus casts ethical and social concerns as irrelevant,
or as stumbling blocks to the corporation's fundamental mandate.
That's the effect the law has inside the corporation. Outside the
corporation the effect is more devastating. It is the law that leads
corporations to actively disregard harm to all interests other than those
of shareholders. When toxic chemicals are spilled, forests destroyed,
employees left in poverty, or communities devastated through plant
shutdowns, corporations view these as unimportant side effects outside
their area of concern. But when the company's stock price dips, that's a
disaster.7
7
Not only is the current corporate fiduciary duty too narrow, it is
largely unenforceable in practice. However, this was not always the case.
Smith v. Van Gorkom,78 a seminal decision related to director's duty of
care, ushered in the change. In Smith, the stockholders of a company
took class action against the board of directors, seeking rescission for a
cash-out merger at a per share price that did not represent the intrinsic
value of the company. 79 The Delaware Supreme Court held the directors
liable for a breach of the duty of care because they made the unintelligent
and uninformed decision to merge at too low a price. 80 Following Smith,
many states passed statutes enabling corporations to adopt charter
provisions to reduce or eliminate the liability of directors for a breach of
their duty of care.8 ' Thus, the duty of care exists, but many corporations
have chosen to eliminate it.
82
74. Hinkley, supra note 67.
75. Hinkley, supra note 67.
76. See infra note 116.
77. See infra note 116.
78. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (finding director liability because the board's decision to approve
proposed cash-out merger was not product of informed business judgment; the board acted in grossly
negligent manner in approving amendments to merger proposal; and the board failed to disclose all
material facts which they knew or should have known before securing stockholders' approval of
merger) overruled by DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 102(b)(7) (2004) (certificate of incorporation may
contain a provision eliminating or limiting personal liability of a director with certain limited
exceptions) as stated in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. Ch. 2001).
79. Smith, 488 A.2d at 863, 866.
80. Id. at 864.
81. Smith, supra note 6, at 289. Thirty-eight states currently have such provisions. Smith,
supra note 6, at 289 n.52.
82. Smith, supra note 6, at 289.
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Additionally, the legal impact of the director's fiduciary duty is
minimized by the business judgment rule.83 The business judgment rule
embodies the idea that courts should not question whether a business
decision was good or bad because courts are not experts in business.84
Rather, a business decision by a director is presumed to have been made
in the best interests of the company, 85 so long as the actions taken by
directors can be attributed to a rational business purpose.86 The business
judgment rule is a presumption that shareholders must overcome to make
a director liable for breaching either the duty of care or loyalty.87 In fact,
the business judgment rule is an almost impenetrable shield for directors
of public corporations although, theoretically, it does not cover decisions
that cause egregious losses.88 However, in practice this exception has not
resulted in awards of money judgments against corporate directors.
89
Even though the fiduciary duties are largely unenforceable against
directors, the shareholder primacy norm, which informs the fiduciary
duties, still influences corporate decision making. While one might be
hard pressed to find a director who openly claims that he or she is driven
purely by a duty to maximize profits,90 there is little else that can explain
why directors make decisions that cause grave harm with impunity.
Because shareholders are protected by the limited liability of directors
and thus suffer only a portion of the costs of bad decisions, they tend to
prefer decisions that may have a high risk of failure but also a high
payout, regardless of the cost to society.91
Finally, government regulation is an insufficient "check" on
corporate behavior. Regulations are written by outsiders to the
corporation and work by first allowing harm and then dealing with the
83. Hintmann, supra note 59, at 574. There are four main rationales for business judgment rule:
(1) the courts recognize that even the most honest and well-intentioned director can make an
improvident decision; (2) the courts recognize the inherent risk involved in business decisions,
therefore the rule alleviates the fear of judicial second-guessing and allows the directors broad
discretion in making company policy; (3) the rule keeps courts from ruling on business decisions
when they are less equipped to hand such decisions than directors; and (4) the business judgment
rule ensures that directors, and not shareholders, control the corporation. Hintmann, supra note 59, at
574.
84. See Smith, supra note 6, at 292.
85. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that the business
judgment rule is a "presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.").
86. Smith, supra note 6, at 286.
87. Hintmann, supra note 59, at 579.
88. Hintmann, supra note 59, at 579.
89. Smith, supra note 6, at 287 (citing Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052
(Del. Ch. 1996)).
90. Smith, supra note 6, at 291.
91. Greenfield, supra note 42, at 103.
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aftermath.92 These regulations also do not require corporations to change
their internal policies to prevent harm.93 It is it is generally understood
that it is cheaper to prevent harm than it is to clean it up afterwards, and
it is often better to place responsibility to avoid a problem on the person
in the best position to prevent harm effectively and efficiently.94 While
some industry regulating laws contain severe penalties, they also are
often criticized as having no "teeth," making enforcement almost
impossible.
95
To summarize, state laws of incorporation generally restrict the
breadth of concerns that a corporate agent must consider before deciding
a course of action. Thus, state laws do not prohibit corporate actors from
making decisions where the costs are externalized in ways that can result
in social and individual harm.96 Fixation on shareholder interests can
result in managerial decisions that are overly risky from society's
perspective.97 Although the pursuit of profit does not necessarily cause
harm, Jason Kelly is an example of how a duty to act only in the interests
of profit maximization can create irreparable harm. The legal foundation
for such a duty that allows for this harm, and allows for it to go
unpunished, must change.
C. The Callfor Change to the Status Quo
is Not Limited to External Stakeholders
The call for change hails from many forums. There are numerous
federal lawsuits pending against United States corporations asserting
claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act98 for alleged complicity in
human rights abuses perpetrated by governments of the country in which
92. Greenfield, supra note 42,at 107.
93. See Greenfield, supra note 42,at 107.
94. Greenfield, supra note 42,at 107.
95. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Escobar, Holding Corporate Officers Criminally responsible for
Environmental Crimes: Collapsing the Doctrines of Piercing the Corporate Veil and the Responsible
Corporate Officer, 30 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 305 (2004) (discussing the
problems of criminal liability under the Resource Conservation Recovery Act and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act).
96. Greenfield, supra note 42, at 103.
97. Greenfield, supra note 42, at 103.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." The statute lay dormant for many years until it was revitalized in 1980 with Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), and other cases of torture that took place in foreign
nations but were tried in United States courts. See generally Jason Jarvis, A New Paradigm for the




these corporations do business or source goods.99 There has also been a
case against Nike by a member of the public alleging that Nike has made
false statements about its workplace practices in third world countries.100
The Nike case has left uncertain what can and cannot be communicated
to the public without creating potential liability.'01 These cases indicate
creative tactics used to seek recourse for some of the more egregious
corporate acts and also signal a growing awareness within the legal
community of the need to change the way corporations make decisions.
However, activity is not limited to the courts.
Local and international legislatures have passed various measures
aimed at addressing the problems associated with the singular duty to act
in the shareholder's best interests. Some states in the United States have
adopted non-shareholder constituency statutes,10 2 which allow managers
to consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers, and
customers of the corporation and others when making decisions. 0 3 In
May 2001, the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") clarified that
shareholder divestment campaigns and boycotts can be considered
material, thus subject to disclosure under SEC rules. 10 4 In 2001, France
passed legislation mandating disclosure of social and environmental
issues in corporate annual reports.' 0 5 Belgium, France, Germany,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom each have enacted laws requiring
pension funds to disclose how social, ethical, and environmental issues
are taken into account in employer investments. 0 6 In August 2003, the
99. See e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Bano v. Union Carbide
Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001); Bigio v. Coca Cola, 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2001); Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F.
Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 2d. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
100. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 4602 (U.S. June
26, 2003) (No. 02-575). The California Supreme Court held that Nike was not entitled to First
Amendment protection for public statements that were made in defense of workplace practices in
third-world production facilities. Id. at 319. After granting certiorari and holding oral arguments, the
U.S. Supreme Court returned the case to the California trial court without decision, after which the
suit was settled. Id.
101. Id. at 319.
102. Ronn S. Davids, Constituency Statutes: An Appropriate Vehicle for Addressing Transition
Costs?, 28 COLUM. J. L & SOC. PROBS, 145, 156 n.47 (1995) (listing various state statutes). Since the
early 1980s, approximately thirty states have enacted corporate constituency statutes; Delaware has
not enacted such legislation. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
42, (5th ed. 2000).
103. Smith, supra note 6, at 289. These statutes generally do not, however, provide for a cause
of action based on decisions of directors and they do not contemplate any significant change to the
board's decision making process. Smith, supra note 6, at 290.
104. Danette Wineberg & Phillip H. Rudolph, Corporate Social Responsibility. What Every In
House Counsel Should Know, 22 No. 5 ACC DOCKET 68, 72 (2004).
105. Id. at 74.
106. Id
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United Nations issued its "Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights," which serves as a kind of "Code of Ethics" for global
companies. 10 7 These are simply guidelines, however, with no provisions
or mandate for enforcement.
A sense of the need for change is also coming from within
corporations themselves. A recent global survey commissioned by the
World Economics Forum in 2003 concluded that for most business
leaders, there is a compelling case for taking action on issues related to
corporate citizenship. 10 8 The report states that it makes good business
sense to be a good corporate citizen on two grounds: first, it makes sense
for a company to have a clear purpose and set of values; second,
businesses prosper in societies that are prosperous. 10 9 Seventy percent of
Chief Executive Officers ("CEOs") surveyed in 2002 agreed that
corporate social responsibility is vital to the profitability of any
company."10 A survey of executives from 350 major companies in
Europe found that seventy-eight percent agree that integrating
responsible business practices can significantly improve profitability."'
The state of research in this area is still young, but it has been found that
Corporate Social Responsibility'l 2  leadership companies have
outperformed their peers financially and have better employee relations,
community relations, and products and diversity measures. 113
Finally, the need for change is recognized by the general citizenry.
A September 2000 Business Week Harris Poll asked Americans which of
the following two propositions they agreed with more strongly: That
corporations should have only purpose - to make the most profit for their
shareholders - and the pursuit of that goal will be best for America in the
107. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Subcomm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 1 (2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En?Opendocument (last visited Feb.
8, 2005).
108. See generally, TASK FORCE OF WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM CEOs, JOINT STATEMENT,
GLOBAL CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE FOR CEOs AND BOARDS CEOs 10




11. Wineberg, supra note 104, at 78.
112. See Donaldson, supra note 41, at 2. "Corporate Social Responsibility," or CSR, is a much
used, but rarely defined, term that incorporates such things as concern for the environment,
obligations to employees, sourcing from developing countries, host country government relations,
relationships with local communities and regulating gifts and sensitive payment. Donaldson, supra
note 41, at 2.
113. See Donaldson, supra note 41, at 2-3.
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long run; or, that corporations should have more than one purpose. They
also owe something to their workers and the communities in which they
operate, and they should sometimes sacrifice some profit for the sake of
making things better for their workers and communities. 14 Ninety-five
percent of respondents chose the second proposition." 15 The general
public would prefer that corporations do something that they are not duty
bound to do - to have concern for the public interest.
In short, it is increasingly recognized across society that
corporations should have a degree of accountability beyond that which is
owed their shareholders. These sentiments encourage not only the idea of
corporate social responsibility but also innovative ways to make the
concept a practical reality. One promising solution is the Code for
Corporate Citizenship.
IV. THE CODE FOR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP:
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE THAT DEALS WITH THE PROBLEM
OF CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR AT ITS SOURCE -
THE CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTY
This section describes the Code for Corporate Citizenship. It also
covers how and why the Code for Corporate Citizenship can address the
fundamental problems with corporate law by expanding the corporate
fiduciary duties. It ends by addressing some of the main criticisms
against the Code and concludes that the Code should be adopted, albeit
with a minor amendment.
A. The Code and How the it Works
The Code for Corporate Citizenship" 6 proposes to amend state
corporate charter legislation by expanding the duties of corporate
directors to include a duty to safeguard certain social interests.117 The
Code imposes both civil and criminal strict liability on corporate
directors who breach the duty and defines the duty as "the responsibility
of the directors to manage the corporation in a manner that does not
cause damage to the environment, violate human rights, adversely affect
114. Arnie Cooper, Twenty-Eight Words that Could Change the World, THE SUN,
Sept. 2004, at 8, available at http://forums.seib.org/corporation2020/documents/Resources/Hinkley_
lnterview.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
115. Id.
116. Sometimes referred to as the "Code for Corporate Responsibility," the Code was
developed by Robert Hinkley, a securities attorney who says that corporations act as they do for one
simple reason: they are bound to make profit for shareholders. This inhibits executives and directors
from being socially responsible. Id.
117. See THE MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY, at http://www.citizenworks.org/
enronlcorpcode-text.php (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
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the public health or safety, damage the welfare of communities in which
the corporation operates, or violate the dignity of the corporation's
employees."' 18
The Code leaves a duty to shareholders in place, not tampering with
decades of tradition in corporate governance law, but appending a clear
statement of another longstanding legal tradition - that one may not use
one's property to damage others. 1 9 Section Two of the Code stipulates
that:
In the case that any corporation under this [chapter] causes damage
to the environment, violates human rights, adversely affects the public
health or safety, damages the welfare of communities in which the
corporation operates, or violates the dignity of its employees, any
person damaged by such action, may either in law or in equity ... sue
either the corporation or any person who was a director of the
corporation at the time the damage occurred.
120
Specific provisions of the Code include exemptions, damages,
contributions, penalties, and the like. 121 Exemptions from liability are
included in Section Three. 122 Section Four allows for damages to
represent the greater of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or
three times the savings which accrued to corporation as a result of
damage to the public interest as defined in Section One 123 and also allows
for optional punitive damages. 124 The Model Code specifies contribution
for damages, 125 controlling liability and joint and several liability, 126 a
statute of limitations, and a fifteen year window between enactment and
118. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: DUTY TO SAFEGUARD THE PUBLIC
INTEREST § 1 (2005).
119. Marjorie Kelly, Address at the Minnesota Senate Hearing (Feb. 14, 2004), at http:/
www.c4cr.org/article I 6.html (last visited June 27, 2005).
120. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED
TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST § 2 (2005).
121. See e.g. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: EXEMPTIONS FROM LIABILITY
IN CERTAIN CASES § 3 (2005); CONTRIBUTION § 5 (2005); LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING PERSONS § 7
(2005); AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES § 9 (2005).
122. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: EXEMPTIONS FROM LIABILITY IN
CERTAIN CASES § 3 (2005). No director is liable if damage complained of was the direct result of an
action approved by the Board of Directors that the director voted against, or the decision was made
before the director became a member of the board. Id. The article does not apply to corporations the
annual revenues of which are less than $5 million. Id.
123. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: DUTY TO SAFEGUARD THE PUBLIC
INTEREST § 1 (2005).
124. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: EXEMPTIONS FROM LIABILITY IN
CERTAIN CASES § 3 (2005).
125. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: CONTRIBUTION § 5 (2005).




enforcement to allow corporations to adjust their practices in accordance
with the Code. 127 Finally, the Code allows for injunction of future
violations of the act and penalties for past violations by the attorney
general in the public interest, 128 and assigns criminal penalties in additionto any civil penalties when any director willfully violates Section One. 129
B. The Code.: More Effective than Regulation
The Code will be enforced in the same way that securities laws are
enforced; investors will be able to bring private lawsuits against a
company and its directors, irrespective of the company's intent or
motive. 130 The Code will contain provisions for private actions by
members of the public and actions by the attorney general on the public's
behalf. 131 The threat of civil litigation and possible criminal sanctions is
intended to be a powerful deterrent to violations of the Code.'
32
Directors likely will change the way they run their companies. In
the same way the securities laws passed in the 1930s caused companies
to be more cautious in the way they offered securities to the public and
distributed information to investors on an ongoing basis, companies post-
Code adoption will be much more cautious in the decisions they make
that impact the greater society.
133
Unlike laws that prohibit specific behavior for the purpose of
protecting the public interest, the Code addresses the cause and not the
symptoms of corporate misbehavior. For instance, in the Tyson Foods
case study it is evident that OSHA standards do not protect the needs of
employees in the meat and poultry packing industry. First, the
regulations are too lenient to be effective.' 34 Second, OSHA penalties are
applied after the fact and, because Tyson Foods is disputing liability for
incidents like the death of Jason Kelly, there is nothing to suggest that
Tyson will take action to remedy the circumstances that caused the
accident. 35 Third, OSHA and other similar agencies have budgetary,
resource, and political constraints that prevent them from proactively
ensuring compliance.' 36 Lastly, existing regulations can run counter to
127. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 6 (2005).
128. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: ATTORNEY GENERAL § 8 (2005).
129. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: CRIMINAL PENALTIES § 9 (2005).
130. Robery Hinkley, 28 Words to Redefine Corporate Duties: The Proposal for a Code for
Corporate Citizenship, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Jul.-Aug. 2002, available at http://




134. BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR, supra note 32.
135. BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR, supra note 30.
136. BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR, supra note 34.
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the corporate fiduciary duty because they ask the corporation to consider
more than the pursuit of profit. 137 Thus, the only option for agencies is to
take legal action; yet, any legal action must contend with a response from
a multimillion dollar company with comparatively greater resources.
Companies like Tyson have the resources to lobby against further
regulation detrimental to their interests. 138 The ultimate result is an
agency that is ill-equipped to properly prevent future tragedies.
C. Criticisms of the Code and Counterarguments
The Code is on the table for consideration in California, Minnesota,
and Maine. Opponents claim the following problems with the Code: (t)
it is too vague, (2) it will drive up corporate overhead by increasing the
possibility of litigation, and (3) it will cause an exodus of business away
from states that adopt the Code to states that choose not to adopt the
Code. Each of these criticisms will be addressed in turn.
1. The Duty in the Code is too Vague
The criticism that the Code is too vague has two prongs. First,
critics claim that the terms that define the amended fiduciary duty are too
vague and will lead to constitutional challenges under the void for
vagueness doctrine. 139 Second, critics contend that, even if the Code is
not unconstitutional, the terms will result in layers of litigation to
determine its meaning. 140 One senator in the California Senate expressed
his concern:
Almost any corporate act is likely to have an impact on "the
welfare of the communities in which the corporation operates." The
provision is so vague that it could easily become a double-edged sword
used against responsible corporations. For example, who is to say that a
company that agrees to a "closed shop" or closes one plant in favor of
another more environmentally friendly is not also materially impacting
the welfare of the communities in which it operates? 141
The constitutional law of vagueness is a matter of due process. 142 In
general, a law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons "of
137. See generally supra text accompanying notes 40-66.
138. See, e.g., TYSON FOODS, INC., 2004-2005 INVESTOR FACT BOOK, available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/mediafiles/irol/65/65476/reports/04 05 factbook.pdf (last visited June
11, 2005) (reporting that Tyson Foods, Inc. made S26.4 billion in sales for 2004).
139. Stephen J. Redner, Sarbanes and the States, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, Jan. 6, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 12284306.
140. Id.
141. Id.




common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application."'' 43 For criminal statutes, if the statute is so vague as to
criminalize an innocent act, a conviction under the statute cannot be
sustained. 44 Vagueness occurs when a legislature states its proscription
in terms so indefinite that the line between innocent and condemned
conduct becomes a matter of guesswork and persons are not given fair
notice of what to avoid.145 Objections to vagueness under the due process
clause rest on lack of notice and may be overcome by showing that a
reasonable person would know that his conduct was at risk of being
prohibited. 146 The assessment for constitutional vagueness is not
conducted in a vacuum, and it is not the academic study of words but
whether fair notice has been given. 147
The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates, as well as
the importance of fair notice, depends in part on the nature of the
statute.148 For instance, economic regulation is subject to a less strict
vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow. 149 A
business may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by
its own inquiry to ensure complicity since much may be at stake. 50
Vagueness is also tolerated to a slightly greater degree in civil rather than
criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are
qualitatively less severe.151
The constitutional vagueness objection to the Code is weak because
the Code regulates corporations. A corporation, by its nature, is expected
to plan its activities carefully; corporations are subject to rules of
accounting, securities, and the like,' 52 and are accustomed to consulting
relevant regulation for clarification in advance of acting. The Code has a
built-in fifteen year adoption period that would give ample time for
consultation. 53 Tolerance for vagueness is greater when corporations are
the subject of the legislation because corporations are expected and
accustomed to do their homework. Thus, it is unlikely that a corporation
will have to engage in guesswork to ascertain the extent and meaning of
the Code and will have fair notice of how to conduct its operations.
143. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
144. See Winters v. N.Y., 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
145. See American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O., v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
146. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).




151. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
152. See American Communications Ass'n, ClO., 339 U.S. at 412.
153. MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 6 (2005).
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
Despite the criticism that the terms used in the Code are so vague as
to make compliance impossible, similar concepts in other areas of law
have not failed for vagueness, and courts have interpreted them easily.
Take for example the "public policy exception" to the at-will
employment doctrine.154 The at-will doctrine provides that an employee
can unilaterally leave employment and an employer can unilaterally
terminate employment for any reason, no reason, or even for a morally
bad reason. 55 The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine allows a
wrongful termination cause of action for an at-will employee whose
employment is terminated when the termination is believed to violate
"public policy. ,1 56 Public policy is defined as the principle that no one
can lawfully do that which tends to be injurious to the public or against
the public good.15 7 One state Supreme Court stated that there is no
precise definition of what constitutes clearly mandated public policy.
58
Consequently, public policy determinations are ultimately made on an
ad-hoc basis by the high court of the jurisdiction.' 59  These
determinations, while ad-hoc, are not left to judicial imagination. 60 Most
states considering whether the "public policy" exception should apply
have looked for clear direction from constitutional, legislative, or
regulatory schemes since they provide existing expressions of policy.
61
Thus, while there is no concrete interpretation of "public policy" and
there are jurisdictional differences as to the source of "public policy,"
courts are able to devise what conduct implicates public policy and to
decide wrongful termination cases accordingly.
The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine is an example of
how courts can define a phrase that would otherwise appear vague. A
similar approach could be used by courts to define the terms that
comprise the expanded fiduciary duty of the Code such as "human
rights," "damage to the environment," "public health and safety,"
"community welfare," and "employee dignity." Definition of such terms
could be sourced from federal and state constitutions, statutes,
regulations, judicial opinions, and applicable international law.
154. See generally, Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-at-
will doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543
(2004).
155. Id. at 550. All states, except Montana, are "at-will" jurisdictions.
156. Id. at 547.
157. Boyle v. Vista Eyeware, 700 S.w.2d 859, 871 (Mo. App. 1985).
158. Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491,493 (Il1. 1998).
159. Cavico, supra note 154, at 591.
160. Cavico, supra note 154, at 591.
161. See Milton v. lIT Research Inst., 138 F.3d 519, 523 (4th Cir. 1998). However, there is
some difference among jurisdictions as to whether judicial opinions can also be the basis of what
constitutes "pubic policy;" see also Cavico, supra note 154, at 550.
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To define the term "human rights" for the purpose complying with
the Code, corporations could look to judicial decisions for direction. The
United States has heard and resolved claims of what are classified as
human rights abuses under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 62 This Act allows
for aliens to bring tort claims for violations of human rights abuses that
have taken place outside of the United States, inasmuch as the claims
exist as part of the "law of nations."'' 63 Granted, litigation under the Alien
Tort Claims Act has been limited to the most egregious human rights
abuses such as torture, summary executions, sexual assault, forced labor
and slavery. 164 However, alien tort claims litigation indicates that the
term "human rights" is not so vague that a corporation would have to
guess as to its meaning since the courts have already defined it in other
contexts.
A definition of "human rights" could also derive from sources of
international law or treaties signed and ratified by the United States.
165
These include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 166 Further, the United States has signed the United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights which specifically lists what is protected
by the covenant, such as the right to be treated equally by the law, to life,
liberty, and security of the person; right to privacy; freedom of assembly;
and the right to be free from torture, forced labor, and slavery. 67 Thus, if
states were to adopt the Code, there are existing standards and definitions
of what are "human rights" that could easily set the boundaries of
corporate behavior.
Further, if corporations were to claim that the Code's duty is too
vague, they might refer to their own "Code of Ethics" for guidance. For
instance, Unocal Corporation's code 168 declares that it will respect
human rights in all its activities. 169 The Gap 7 ° states that it has over
162.28 U.S.C. § 1350(1798).
163. Id.
164. Kinley, supra note 7, at 941.
165. For a list of international treaties related to human rights that the United States has signed
and ratified see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (June 9, 2004), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
166. Id.
167. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(nl1), (December 10, 1948),
available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
168. Unocal is one of the world's largest energy resource and project development companies,
with $8.2 billion in revenue reported for 2004. To view the Unocal report online, see http://
www.unocal.com/aboutucl/glance.htm (last visited June 11, 2005).
169. UNOCAL, CODE OF CONDUCT (February, 2004), available at http://www.unocal.com/
ucl code of conduct/index.htm.
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ninety employees around the world who work to improve labor
conditions. 171 Tyson Foods says it is committed to conducting its
operations in a manner which respects and preserves the natural
resources of the areas in which it lives and works. 172 The 2000
signatories to the United Nations Global Compact say that they embrace
ten core principles respecting human rights, labor rights, and protection
of the environment.173 Insofar as vagueness requires that a reasonable
person knows that his or her behavior is at risk, the existence of these
"Codes," "principles," "compacts," and "statements" suggests that a
corporation would know when its behavior is at risk.
Similarly, the duties to protect the environment, employees, and
public health and safety in the Code are not so vague that a corporation
would not have fair warning as to their meaning. States that incorporate
the Code could begin by using standards that already exist in the relevant
regulatory scheme. This suggestion does not make the Code redundant
because there is a fundamental difference between after-the-fact
regulations and before-the-fact, proactive protection of the environment,
public health, and safety. 174 After-the-fact regulations can be bypassed
and do not prevent an accident from happening again. Take for instance,
the lack of warnings of poisonous gases in the hydrolizer mentioned in
the above case study. 175 If Tyson Foods successfully avoids liability for
Jason Kelly's death, there is no incentive for the corporation to incur the
cost of providing warnings in the future since Tyson loses nothing by not
warning. On the other hand, if the corporation were held directly liable
for making the decision not to warn of dangerous chemicals, it would
170. Gap Inc. operates three brands of apparel: The Gap, Banana Republic, and Old Navy and
reports revenues of $16.3 billion, available at http://www.gapinc.com/public/About/about.shtml (last
visited June 1I, 2005).
171. See THE GAP, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, available at http://www.gapinc.com/
social resp/social resp.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
172. See TYSON FOODS, INC., TYSONCARES ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT, available at
http://www.tysonfoodsinc.com/cares/environment/default.asp (last visited June 11, 2005).
173. United Nations Global Compact, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last
visited Feb. 8, 2005). The United Nations Global Compact has over 2000 signatories, including
twelve of the "Fortune 500." The ten core principles for each signatory is to: (1) support and respect
protection of internationally proclaimed human rights, (2) make sure it is not complicit in human
rights abuses, (3) uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining, (4) eliminate all forms of forced and slave labor, (5) abolish child labor, (6)
eliminate discrimination in employment, (7) support a precautionary approach to environmental
challenges, (8) undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility, (9) encourage
the development of environmentally friendly technologies, and (10) work against all forms of
corruption including extortion and bribery. Id.
174. See supra Part III.B.
175. See supra Part 11.
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ensure that future accidents would not recur because of the high costs
associated with liability.
This is not to say that all of the additional duties that the Code adds
to the corporate fiduciary duty are clear and unambiguous. The duty to
protect "community welfare" may pose a problem of interpretation
because it is not currently regulated like public occupational health and
safety, the environment, and employment relations.1 76 A reasonable
person may not know how to comply with such a duty. For instance,
from where would a court define the geographical limits of a
community? Also, in the event that a corporation leaves a community,
for how long does its duty to that community last? Does the duty to the
community go beyond engaging in fair employment practices, ensuring
health and safety, and protecting the environment already covered in the
Code? The duty to protect the community welfare is vague, as well as
redundant, and should be severed. However, this does not make the
entire Code infirm for vagueness.
In summary, the criticism that the Code is unworkable because its
expanded duty to the environment, employee dignity, public health and
safety, human rights, and community welfare is vague is generally
without merit. Such terms have long been defined in sources such as
existing regulations, case law, international law, and from the currently
unenforceable socially responsible and self-imposed corporate "codes of
behavior." Thus, claims that the Code's duties are vague are unwarranted
and should not prevent the Code from being adopted.
2. Adopting the Code: An Increase in Litigation?
The second criticism against the Code is that expanding individual
liability for directors will lead to an increase in litigation.1 77 The
argument posits that additional liability for corporate directors is "bad for
business" and ultimately bad for society.178 Opponents argue that
implementation of the Code will drive up the cost of doing business and
will decrease the number of businesses that are willing to take the risks,
will decrease overall business, jobs, investment, innovation, and wealth
generation. 1
79
176. See e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)
(1994).
177. See S.B. 917, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/
sen/sb_0901-0950/sb 917 cfa 20040121 120529 sen comm.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
178. CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS: JOB KILLER BILLS
2003, http://www.calchamber.com/index.cfm?navid=441 (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
179. Id
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While the possibility of litigation and liability is a very strong
component of the desired deterrent effect of the Code, increased
litigation will not necessarily result for three reasons. First, the business
judgment rule provides an example of the deference and protection
afforded directors. 80 The rule basically stands for the proposition that
courts should exercise restraint in holding directors liable or otherwise
second guessing business decisions which produce poor results. 81 While
the rule has been interpreted differently in different jurisdictions,' 82 in the
majority of states a director's standard of care is much lower than that of
ordinary negligence. 83 In Delaware, for example, the business judgment
rule amounts to a reduced standard of care, that is, corporate directors
should not act in a way that is grossly negligent in making its
decisions. 84 Ultimately, the Code will not result in increased litigation
because it does not seek to alter the standard of care or overturn the
business judgment rule. Rather the Code will only include more within
the scope of a director's duty of care. 85 Secondly, directors can, and do,
protect themselves and the corporation from the cost of liability by
purchasing insurance protection.186 Accordingly, a director will be
pressured to act in such a way as to keep insurance premiums at a
minimum. Finally, the criticism that the Code will result in increased
litigation disregards the very potent deterrent effect that the Code will
have in altering the behavior of corporate decisions makers. These
corporations will act in advance to protect themselves against possible
future liability.
3. Adopting the Code: an Exodus of Business?
The final argument against adoption of the Code is that the change
will cause corporate flight. 87 This argument, while it may be convincing,
180. See supra discussion of the business judgment rule in Part III.B.
181. Gevurtz, supra note 58.
182. Gevurtz, supra note 58.
183. Gevurtz, supra note 58.
184. Aronson v. Lewis 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
185. See MODEL UNIF. CODE FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 118. Some have argued
that there is no real reason why the standard of care for corporate directors is any lower than what an
attorney or a physician owes clients. See Gevurtz, supra note 63.
186. As many as ninety-five percent of "Fortune 500" companies maintain directors and
officers liability insurance today. See FINDLAW FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS, DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE OVERVIEW, available at http://profs.1p.findlaw.com/insurance/
insurance l.html (last visited June 11, 2005).
187. That is, that a corporation, acting in its own best interest, will take its business elsewhere
if the incorporating state's laws are burdensome.
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is speculative and difficult to support or deny without empirical
evidence.
The California Senate Committee considering the Code has
suggested that if California were to amend its corporate chartering
legislation in accordance with the Code, it will discriminate against the
few companies that are incorporated in California and will cause an
exodus of business to states without the Code. 88 The Senate committee
has suggested that it would be more prudent for California to consider
such an amendment once other states have done so, or at least after
Delaware has done so. 189
Without discussing the practical difficulties that exist for most
corporations to "shop" for locations to reincorporate, there are a few
responses to this argument. First, there is something inherently
suspicious about protecting a corporation who would change the state of
its incorporation just to avoid potential liability for committing human
rights abuses or damaging the environment. Many corporations act as
good citizens without the additional duties of the Code. 190 The Code aims
to alter the behavior of those few that do not. Second, there are very
strong business arguments for corporations to act as good citizens and to
support the adoption of the Code.' 91 This business value is not limited to
the positive press that comes from an honest concern for the public
interest in a corporation. 192 Studies conclude that corporations that
operate with the public interest in mind are more successful that those
that do not. 193 Third, the fact that corporations can shop for locations to
incorporate is problematic and might be best addressed via other means.
That is, comparatively favorable corporate law in one place, which
attracts corporations that are located in other states, allows the favorable
states to externalize the true costs of its corporate rules onto other states
and other nonshareholder stakeholders.'
94
188. CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS: JOB KILLER BILLS
2003, http://www.calchamber.com/index.cfm?navid-441 (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
189. S.B. 917, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/
sen/sb_0901-0950/sb 917 cfa 20040121_120529 sen comm.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
190. See Donaldson, supra note 41, at 2; Cooper, supra note 114, at 1I. The vast majority of
companies are small, family owned businesses. They already operate more or less without violating
the public interest. If they are not good citizens, they'll get a bad reputation and will soon be out of
business. Cooper, supra note 114, at 11.
191. Cooper, supra note 114, at 11. "A recent analysis of 95 empirical studies on corporate
social performance and corporate financial performance by Harvard's Joshua Margolis and JP Walsh
at the University of Michigan showed that about nine times as many studies revealed a positive
correlation between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance as those that
indicated a negative one."
192. Clive Crook, The Good Company, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 3.
193. Donaldson, supra note 41, at 2.
194. See Greenfield, supra note 42, at 101.
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V. CONCLUSION
Implementing a series of warnings about hydrogen sulfide gas in
the hydrolizer at Tyson Foods would have impacted Tyson's bottom line.
Tyson Foods was under no affirmative obligation to take any measures to
warn employees of the dangerous gases. Unfortunately, the absence of
such measures impacted Jason Kelly and his family in the most serious
way. Despite the fact that someone in the chain of command may have
known that warnings were needed, that the cause of death was
asphyxiation from the gases, and that Tyson Foods is contesting liability,
it would not do Jason Kelly's family any good to hold a protest on the
Tyson CEO's front lawn. The problem of corporate misbehavior is
bigger than just the decisions of individual actors. Because the duty that
corporate law places on corporate directors is narrow and the regulatory
scheme of managing corporate behavior is insufficient, corporations may
cause grave harm by externalizing the costs of doing business.
Corporate law has assumed the role of upholding the shareholder
primacy model. Corporate law exists simply to maximize shareholder
wealth. Corporate law must change if society no longer wants to bear the
costs of corporate misdeeds.
The Code for Corporate Citizenship is the best way to deal with
corporate misdeeds because it expands the accountability of corporate
directors and causes them to make decisions with more than just profit
maximization in mind. The Code recognizes the ultimate purpose of the
corporation but also recognizes that the corporation is part of society.
The Code will allow directors to make decisions with their "director's
hats" on in the same way they that would with their "citizen's hats" on.
The Code will help prevent corporate misdeeds by introducing liability
for violating the duty to society. Most importantly however, it will deter
directors from making decisions that result in harm. Criticisms of the
Code are not strong enough to counter the very real need for change that
will make corporations better citizens. Although the Code for Corporate
Citizenship is currently under consideration in only a handful of states, it
should be adopted in every state.
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